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B R I E F O F P L A I N T I F F and R E S P O N D E N T

N A T U R E OF T H E CASE
This was an action by the Plaintiff-Respondent
(hereinafter called Kay Goff or Plaintiff) against Defendant-Appellant (hereinafter called Annette Doble
Goff or Defendant) for damages for personal injury
sustained by the Plaintiff arising out of an automobile
accident which occurred on the 22nd day of January,
1973, near the outskirts of Salt Lake City. (At the time
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of the accident, Annette Doble Goff was the fiancee
of one of the Plaintiff's sons. They were married subsequent to the accident, but before the action was filed).
The sole issue involved before the Trial Court which
is involved in this appeal concerns the question whether
or not the Plaintiff was a guest at the time of the accident as defined in 41-9-2, U.C.A. 1953.
DISPOSITION I N T H E L O W E R COURT
The trial was heard in this case on September 10,
1974, before the Honorable Calvin Gould, in and for
Weber County, Utah, sitting without a jury, the same
having been waived by both parties.
On the 20th day of September, 1974, Judge Gould
issued a Memorandum Decision in which he found in
favor of the Plaintiff and against the Defendant and
thereafter a formal Findings of Fact, Conclusions of
Law and Judgment were entered consistent with Judge
Gould's Memorandum Decision.

RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Plaintiff-Respondent seeks to have the Judgment
rendered by Judge Gould affirmed in favor of the
Plaintiff and Against the Defendant.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
Plaintiff-Respondent agrees with the Statement of
Facts set forth in Appellant's Brief.
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ARGUMENT
POINT I
P R E S U M P T I O N S FAVOR CORRECTNESS AND CREDIBILITY OF T H E
FINDINGS AND JUDGMENT OF
T H E T R I A L COURT. T H E B U R D E N
OF SHOWING T H A T T H E Y ARE IN
ERROR IS UPON T H E ATTACKER.
The Utah Supreme Court in First Security Bank
of Utah, N.A. vs. Wright, 521 P.2d 563, held at Page
567,
"Applicable to the various points discussed
here is the traditional rule of review: that the
presumptions favor the correctness and credibility of the findings and judgment; and that
the burden of showing they are in error and
should be overturned is upon the attacker."
The only factual issue in dispute at the trial level was
whether or not the Plaintiff was a guest within the
meaning of the tUah Statute which states as follows:
"41-9-2. 'Guestf defined — For the purpose
of this section the term 'guest' is hereby defined
as being a person who accepts a ride in any
vehicle without giving compensation therefor."
There is no real dispute as to the status of the law in
this State. W e accept the Court's prior decision in Smith
vs. Franklin, 14 Utah 2d 16, 376 P.2d 541 (1962),
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"The test is simple to state and under most
circumstances is easy to apply: a passenger for
hire is one who pays for his ride; a guest is one
who is furnished a ride free of charge. The
former is in the nature of a business transaction
for money; whereas the latter is motivated by
other considerations, usually of a social nature.
Difficulties are encountered where both factors are present in such a way that it does not
appear with sufficient certainty to justify a
ruling as a matter of law either that the rider
was a guest or a passenger for hire. Where
such uncertainty exists, the definition given
by Sec. 41-9-2, U.C.A. 1953, that a guest is 'a
person who accepts a ride in any vehicle without giving 'compensation' therefor, does not
provide the conclusive answer. The question
arises as to what constitutes 'compensation' sufficient to change what normally would be a
guest to a passenger for hire.
I t must be conceded that where it is shown
that the rider is basically a social guest, neither
the giving of just any 'compensation,' which
might be some inconsequential amount of
money or other consideration of value, nor
even the sharing of expenses, merely in social
reciprocation for the ride, would change the
relationship to that of passenger for hire. The
phrase 'compensation therefor' as used in the
statute means compensation for the ride.
Therefore, it would have to be sufficient money
'or other thing of value' that is reasonably
could be supposed that the parties so regarded
it. But whether there is profit in the transac-
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tion is obviously not the determining factor.
Where payment for the ride is the main inducement for it, the fact that there may also exist
some social incentive which makes giving the
ride enjoyable or desirable for the driver would
not change its character to that of host and
guest."
"Howsoever convenient or expedient it
may be to see things as either black or white
and to avoid perplexing problems in the twilight areas of uncertainty, that cannot always
be done. Where both payment and social incentive are present, and the evidence would
support a finding that each exerted a substantial influence on hauling the passenger, the
problem as to the relationship between the parties must be faced up to and resolved by submititng the issue to the jury (or fact trier),
(emphasis added)
From our consideration of this subject and
the authorities which have dealt with it, we
are persuaded that the sound and practical
view is that the determination should be made
on the basis of which was the chief inducement
for giving the ride."
Assuming the test is not what is the "main inducement" but in fact what is the "chief inducement", as
suggested by the Defendant-Appellant, the decision of
the Trial Court was correct in view of the totality of
the circumstances.
Counsel has cited other cases in which the parties
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were clearly social guests and the whole purpose of the
venture was clearly social in nature. There are many
factors to distinguish the case now before the Court
from the other cases in which the Courts have found
the injured passenger to be a guest. Facts that distinguish the present case are:
1. The purpose of the trip for everyone in the
automobile, with the exception of the Plaintiff and his
wife, was to attend a Tupperware meeting in Salt Lake
City. (T. 20) The purpose of the trip for the Plaintiff
was to visit the hospital in Salt Lake City. Therefore,
the incentive for travelling to Salt Lake City was different for the Plaintiff. The other persons in the automobile intended to part company with the Plaintiff upon
their arrival in Salt Lake City.
2. The ride was solicited by the Plaintiff. (T.9)
Five Dollars, ($5.00) were paid in advance of the trip
by the Plaintiff's wife. (T. 29)
3. John took the money, departed from his father's home in Riverdale, and journeyed to 12th Street
and Wall Avenue, Ogden, Utah, some substantial distance from his father's home where he secured gasoline
at a cost of $4.00, pocketing the remaining $1.00 which
he used for lunch at a later time during the week. (T.
24-29)
4. After leaving the gas station, John picked up
all of the other persons who were to accompany him
to Salt Lake with the exception of his mother and
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father. They all lived reasonably close to the gas station
on 12th and Wall Avenue, where the gas was secured.
(T. 30)
5. The most expeditious or convenient route for
John and the others to journey to Salt Lake was to get
on the freeway at 24th Street, avoid the traffic of Wall
Avenue, Riverdale, Road, etc., and proceed directly to
Salt Lake City. (T.31)
6. I t was substantially out of their way to return
to the Goff home to pick up the Plaintiff and his wife.
The route of travel required travelling south on Wall
Avenue, then on to Riverdale Road, leaving Riverdale
Road and travelling one mile from Riverdale Road to
the Goff home, then returning over that distance of
one mile back to Riverdale Road and proceeding to
Salt Lake City. (T. 8)
7. John had to go out of his way, accept inconvenience, and accept delay in time in order to provide
the transportation to his father and mother. When asked
why he returned to the Goff home, he stated clearly,
"Because they paid me the money". (T. 3)
In the Smith case, Justice Crockett said,
"The phrase, 'compensation therefor', as used
in the statute means compensation for the ride.
Therefore, it would have to be sufficient money
(or other thing of value) that it reasonably
could be supposed that the parties so regarded
it." (Emphasis added)
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This Court in Charlton vs. Hackett,
389, 360 P.2d 176 (1961) said,

11 Utah 2d

"In considering the attack on the findings and
judgment of the trial court it is our duty to
follow these cardinal rules of review: to indulge them a presumption of validity and correctness; to require the appellant to sustain
the burden of showing error; to review the
record in the light most favorable to them;
and not to disturb them if they find substantial support in the evidence." (Emphasis
added)
From the evidence adduced at the trial, this Court
can find substantial support for Judge Gould's determination that the payment of $5.00 was sufficient compensation that the parties regarded it to be of sufficient
value to cause John to return to the home of his father
and provide transportation for him to Salt Lake City.
John and the others would have gone to Salt Lake
City with or without the father. Their business there
was completely separate and independent from the business of the Plaintiff. True, the payment of money had
nothing whatever to do with their journey to Salt Lake
City, but it obviously had everything to do with their
return to the Goff residence to pick up the Plaintiff.
The evidence would indicate that it was not only the
main inducement, or the chief inducement, but was in
all likelihood the only inducement for their return to
the Goff home and to provide transportation to Salt
Lake City. These are the facts consistent with the testi-
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mony and the findings of the Court, and they ought not
be lightly overturned. The presumption is for correctness and credibility of the findings of the Trial Court
and the Defendant-Appellant has not met their burden.
POINT II
T H I S COURT S H O U L D V I E W T H E
E V I D E N C E I N A L I G H T MOST FAVO R A B L E TO T H E P L A I N T I F F - R E S P O N D E N T TO S U S T A I N T H E
F I N D I N G S O F T H E L O W E R COURT.
The above-stated principle was enunciated in Hardy
vs. Hendrickson, 27 Utah 2d 251, 495 P.2d 28, (1972),
where the Court said.
"On appeal evidence is viewed in light most
favorable to sustain the lower court, and the
findings will not be disturbed unless they are
clearly against the weight of the evidence or
it manifestly appears that the court misapplied the law to the established facts."
If the Court views the evidence most favorable to
the Plaintiff-Respondent, we must conclude that the
purpose for the trip to Salt Lake City for Annette,
Diane and John was to attend the Tupperware meeting, and that they would have gone to Salt Lake whether
or not the Plaintiff was in the automobile.
At no time has the Plaintiff implied that this was
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a joint business trip between the Plaintiff and the other
people. The Plaintiff's business was with the Railroad
Retirement Board, the other persons involved had business dealing with a Tupperware meeting.
The sole question was " Why did John Goff and his
girlfriend, and the girlfriend of his brother, return to
the Goff home to pick up the Plaintiff, after they had
already left, secured gasoline, and were in a position
to secure easy acces sto the Freway and the immediate
trip to Salt Lake City?" John said it was because his
father gave him $5.00. (T. 31)
On cross-xamination John admitted that he would
not turn his father down simply because he didn't give
him money. The payment of money was obviously an
established pattern with the Plaintiff because he could
not drive. (T. 9) And, he didn't want to be a free loader
either. (T. 18)
W e are concerned here with the isolated incident
of returning to the Goff home to pick up the Plaintiff.
The Defendant in his brief suggests that this was a close
family and that the transaction was a social one. I t
should be remembered, that although the Defendant
now is a daughter-in-law of the Plaintiff, she was not
married to the Plaintiff's son at the time of the accident and John was not married to Diane at the time of
the accident. These were young people who were girlfriends and boyfriends and who in all likelihood anticipated marriage, but the record is void of any evidence
to indicate that there was some social benefit to these
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young people to bring along a chaperon. The facts indicate that it was inconvenient to return to the Goff
residence. I t was more expedient to get on the freway
at 24th Street or some other point. Even after they returned to Riverdale Road the Goff home was a mile
from the road. (T. 8) The Plaintiff-Respondent suggests that John Goff, who is an uneducated young man,
who now makes his living as a garbage collector, but
who at the time of the accident was a janitor, told the
truth at the time of trial and responded to the questions
in a very forthright and candid manner, and when asked
the reason for return, stated that it was the money
that induced him to do so. H e did not say that it was
one of the reasons, or a main reason, or the chief reason,
it was stated by him as the only reason, but counsel
would now have use read into that answer something
other than the facts stated by the witness.
The Court observed the witnesses, their demeanor,
their frankness, their candor and made a finding of fact
based upon that testimony. The finding was clearly
that, the payment of money was the inducement for
furnishing carriage to Kay Goff, transporting him to
Salt Lake City. Admittedly, it was not the inducement
for John, Diane, or Annette travelling to Salt Lake
City, that is not the issue, but it was the inducement
for them to return to the Goff home and transport the
Plaintiff to Salt Lake City.
The thrust of the Appellant's Brief is to convince
the Court that the Appellant should have won the case.
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This Court clearly stated in Brigham vs. Moon Lake
Electric Association, 24 Utah 2d 292, 470 P.2d 393,
at Page 397, (1970),
"On appeal, the burden is upon the appellant
to convince us that the trial court committed
error and not that the appellant should have
won the case . . . "
I n the separate opinion by Justice Ellett, he stated,
"When we on this court try to do justice in a
law case, we become jurors and thereby give
notice to litigants that if they are dissatisfied with the judgment below, they can have
a new trial by appealing, and if W E do not
think they got a just verdict below, we still
see that they get it regardless of whether there
were any errors of law committed during the
trial. That is too great a burden for and not a
function of this court. We should not reverse
the trial court simply because we disagree
with the jury."
This same concept is applicable to cases tried by a Court
without a jury.
Appellants have shown no errors in law, they have
simply implied that their client should have won at the
trial, and their reference to the responsibility of the
insurance company to pay the claim, and the fact that
the parties are now related by the marriage of the Plaintiff's son, are only intended to obscure the issue and are
certainly immaterial.
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CONCLUSION
There is no dispute between the parties as to the
status of the law in determining when a person is a
guest within the meaning of the statute. And where
both payment of money and some social incentive are
present, that problem must be resolved by the trier of
fact, in this case, Judge Gould, sitting without a jury.
Likewise, there can be no dispute as to the law relative to the presumptions that favor correctness of the
findings of fact and the judgment of the trial court, or
as to the nature of the burden of the Defendant-Appellant when that finding is challenged. True, there may
have been some social incentive, although the evidence
does not so indicate. The evidence is clear as to why
transportation was furnished to the Plaintiff. That evidence must be viewed in a light most favorable to the
Plaintiff and we should presume the correctness of the
findings of the trial court. The decision of the trial
court should therefore be affirmed.
Respectfully submitted,

M E C H A M & RICHARDS
By: RICHARD RICHARDS
2506 Madison Avenue
Ogden, Utah 84401
Attorney for

Plaintiff-Respondent
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